Posted by John Tchoe on July 04, 19101 at 03:24:38:
In Reply to: Re: Material vs. arrangement. posted by Noctillucent on July 03, 19101 at 20:16:20:
: I see what you’re saying, although it's hard to take it literally and not invoke problems. For example, when I perceive a blue sky, are the very atoms or their configuration the blue color I see? And why don’t I perceive atoms, or have direct knowledge of their configuration?
The truth is, I have no direct insight into what atoms look like (other than in books) or how the cortex is physically configured. Why is this if consciousness is that very fact?
<JT>Because you do not have sensory receptors which can detect such things. I never claimed that information comes into the brain telepathically. In fact, if the mind were some immaterial object separate from physical laws, isn't that exactly what we'd expect? But because the mind is entirely within the brain, it is limited by sensory data received through our eyes, ears, etc.</JT>
: Still, let’s accept your claim that the mind IS a configuration of atoms, and specifically, a configuration of atoms in the cortex.
: If this is your understanding as well, let me pose this question:
: If your cortex were made of a different set of atoms, but was otherwise the same, would you still BE you? Or, would it be someone who only ACTS like you?
<JT>I believe I answered this in the post above. If a perfect copy of your brain as-is were to be created, you'd have an identical twin brother or sister with the exact same set of memories up until the moment of copying. From that point on, you'd be two separate, though VERY similar, individuals.
Would you be able to directly perceive what the other person was thinking or feeling? Nope.</JT>
: Regarding your question if the mind were separate from the brain, and whether or not I could choose NOT to experience the effect of a probe.
: This depends on whether or not the brain can effect the mind. If the mind cannot be effected by the brain, then the neurologist, the probe, and the room in which I perceive myself to be, is all an illusion. If I’m convinced by the illusion, it’s entirely possible that I will experience some effect, even if it's due to a false belief. Whether such is true or not, I don’t see how that can be disproved. To my knowledge, philosophy has never been able to make a satisfactory argument showing why that can’t be the case.
<JT>And here comes the last line of defense for all dualists. No, your claims of all this being an illusion cannot be disproved, because you offer no evidence. You can go on believing your ertion for all of eternity and there'd be nothing to disprove it.
The problem with this is that it's relatively simple to come up with such bulletproof theories, all contradictory with the other, and there'd be no way to discern which is true and which is false.
I choose materialism as my philosophy, because it allows me to tell what's true and what's false. I use physical evidence, and reasoning to integrate all of my knowledge into an internally consistent set. I use introspection when nothing else is available, but I do not make claims of correctness when I do so. If I'm going to ert the truth of a given claim, I give reason and available evidence to back it up.
"You can't prove me wrong" is insufficient.</JT>
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